By Terri Moon Cronk
DoD News, Defense Media Activity
WASHINGTON, July 23, 2015 – Calling the Defense Department’s
inadvertent May delivery of live anthrax to a commercial lab “a massive
institutional failure,” Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work today outlined
findings of the review and steps DoD will take to ensure it never happens
again.
But given the failure, Work said at a Pentagon news
conference, he, Defense Secretary Ash Carter and DoD senior leadership “take
absolutely no comfort in this.”
The live-anthrax shipment to a commercial lab was narrowed
down to one of four DoD labs, he said, and added that of the total batches in
the lab’s inventory, more than half tested positive for live anthrax -- 17 of
33.
DoD ships inactivated samples of anthrax spores to outside
labs for research and development of DoD countermeasures to protect U.S.
troops, allies, partners and the American public from biological attack, the
deputy defense secretary said.
“[In] the past, some nations have produced biological weapons,
and we cannot be certain that rogue nations or terrorist groups won’t do the
same in the future,” he said of DoD’s work with anthrax.
Four Labs Handle Anthrax
The four labs that handle anthrax are the Army’s labs at
Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, and in Maryland, the Edgewood Chemical
Biological Center, the Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
and the Naval Medical Research Center.
When the incident unfolded, the Centers for Disease Control
began onsite investigations, and Work directed Frank Kendall, the
undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, to conduct
the 30-day review of the labs’ procedures, processes and protocols associated
with inactivating anthrax spores.
The deputy secretary said he wanted to determine whether the
accidental delivery was a one-time failure or a “more systemic problem” in
DoD’s biohazard safety procedures, and he assembled a team of experts from the
departments of Agriculture, Defense, Energy and Homeland Security, the FBI,
academia and industry.
Review Committee
The review committee found the four labs had irradiated --
destroyed the bacterium with radiation -- 149 batches of live anthrax spores
and reported them inactivated and safe for testing since 2003. All were
accounted for and tested or destroyed, he said.
Other findings:
-- Fifty-three of the 149 batches are no longer in the DoD
inventory or available for testing, and recipients were told to destroy
remaining batches.
-- Of the 96 batches to test in DoD inventory at Dugway
Proving Ground, 17 of 33 tested positive for re-growth/live anthrax.
“Obviously, when over half of anthrax batches presumed to be
inactivated instead prove to contain live anthrax spores, we have a major
problem, and the numbers confirm this judgment,” Work said.
“We know over the past 12 years, 86 laboratories in 20
states, the District of Columbia, and seven foreign countries ultimately
received what were supposedly inactivated spores that originated at Dugway,” he
added.
The deputy defense secretary said he expects the numbers to
increase with secondary shipments, which CDC is responsible for tracking.
No Infections Resulted
Work said the live anthrax was delivered in small amounts of
liquid in “extremely low concentrations,” and all were handled in labs. Not a
single infection resulted in lab workers in 12 years, he added.
Three main causes led to the incident, Work said:
-- No national standards exist for anthrax inactivation
procedures;
-- Several factors at Dugway led to a higher likelihood of
misidentifying the live spores; and
-- Biohazard protocol is not standardized across DoD,
because the labs report to multiple chains of command and two services.
“The American public expects much more from us, and we
should expect much more from ourselves,” Work said. “Secretary Carter has made
plain he expects these issues be dealt with swiftly and comprehensively to
ensure that a failure of this sort never happens again.”
Work said he directed Kendall’s office to:
-- Work with DoD stakeholders, the CDC, and other relevant
departments and agencies to develop standardized irradiation and viability
testing protocols for all DOD labs that work with spore-producing organisms
like anthrax;
-- Ensure sufficient funding is available through the
Chemical and Biological Defense Program for research into the development of
standardized irradiation and viability testing protocols;
-- Review and revise as necessary DoD biosafety and
biosecurity policy and ensure consistent application across DoD laboratories;
and
--Oversee military department and service implementation of
the review committee’s recommendations.
Work said he also directed the secretaries of the Army and
Navy to investigate and develop plans that cover quality assurance, peer
review, and program management and to provide quarterly updates on progress.
The Army secretary was designated as DoD’s executive agent for the Biological
Select Agent and Toxin Biosafety Program, the deputy defense secretary added.
The moratorium on production, handling, testing, and shipment will continue
until the report’s recommendations are addressed, he said.
Notification Led to Immediate Action
Work commended the lab that notified the CDC of the live
anthrax delivery.
“Because of their notification, the department was able to
take immediate action, stop all shipping of inactivated anthrax, assess our
procedures, processes, and protocols; and begin to institute needed changes,”
he said. “In doing so, they helped ensure nobody was infected by anthrax.
“This review taught us lessons we needed to learn, and
identified institutional and procedural failures we need urgently to address,”
he continued. “We are shocked by these failures. … DoD takes full
responsibility for these failures, and we are implementing changes and
recommending the establishment of procedures, processes and protocols that will
prevent such a biohazard safety failure does not happen again.”
Posts
